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the panoply of evidence provided to
establish definitive answers to the
original questions. Furthermore, Platt’s
brief treatment of the consequences
of the war itself may not convince the
reader that the conflict truly marked
the turning point of China’s last golden
age, as the book’s subtitle suggests.
However, Platt is successful in reminding
modern readers of the many unknowns
that remain regarding the eighteenthand nineteenth-century worlds; the
capricious nature of the process by which
interstate relationships emerge; and the
dangers that arise when wealth bleeds
into politics to entice governments to
take action, however contrary to public
opinion those actions may be—a lesson
modern readers would do well to heed.
BENJAMIN E. MAINARDI

Admiral Gorshkov: The Man Who Challenged
the U.S. Navy, by Norman Polmar, Thomas A.
Brooks, and George E. Fedoroff. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2019. 304 pages. $38.95.

This book is long overdue. Few individuals have put their personal stamp on an
aspect of world affairs as conclusively as
Sergey G. Gorshkov, who almost singlehandedly developed the Soviet navy
from a gaggle of vessels and competing
strategies into one of the most formidable forces in maritime history. For
nearly three decades, the Soviet navy was
his navy and Soviet naval strategy was
his strategy. No other figure in maritime
history can quite compare in how
completely he created a military service.
For U.S. naval officers serving during the
latter half of the Cold War, Gorshkov’s
navy was the only real threat. It was not
a question of whether the Soviet and U.S.
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fleets would clash, but only of when. At
sea, U.S. tactical action officers served
as living computers, memorizing the
entire Soviet naval and air orders of
battle—from the peculiarities of ship
and aircraft types to weapons systems to
electronic sensors—to enable them to
deal with a bewildering complexity of
threats in as rapid and effective a manner
as possible. The U.S. Navy’s initial role in
the predicted war for Europe would have
been to move ten Army divisions and
their equipment across the Atlantic in ten
days while running a gauntlet of Soviet
submarines, fleets of Badger and Backfire
bombers, and cruise-missile-firing
surface ships. It is fitting that former
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
wrote the foreword to Admiral Gorshkov,
as it was Lehman’s six-hundred-ship
Navy that was going to have to match
and defeat Gorshkov’s fleet. Under
Lehman, the U.S. Navy embraced a much
more offensive-minded way of thinking
and prepared not only to get the Army
across the Atlantic but to harry the
Soviet flanks while destroying the USSR’s
maritime forces wherever they were.
The authors have delivered a riveting
account of the growth of the Soviet
fleet. They chronicle how Stalin’s desire
for major warships gave way to a more
defensive, coastal, and submarinebased strategy, only to return to a big,
blue-water idea. Gorshkov’s forces
were designed and built neither for
maritime supremacy nor for sea control,
but these would come as the fruits of
victory if the Soviet navy could achieve
its mission: destroying the U.S. Navy,
primarily by sinking its aircraft carriers. Whether it could have done so
remains a matter of conjecture; that the
Soviets would have failed in the effort
remains a matter of faith among most
Cold War–vintage U.S. naval officers.
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Gorshkov joined the Soviet navy before
World War II and served extensively in
the Far East. He gained his first command and saw combat against the
Japanese while supporting Soviet ground
forces in 1938. It was during this period
that he had his first brush with disaster.
Gorshkov commanded an operation
that involved the towing of a newly built
destroyer to port. Things went wrong
and the ship was lost; his career was in
peril. However, support from his seniors
in the chain of command saved him.
As a young captain in World War II,
Gorshkov saw combat in Crimea and the
Black Sea. He displayed personal bravery,
and he played a role in the defense of
Stalingrad. After the war, and particularly after the Cuban missile crisis,
Gorshkov became adept at explaining
the role of the Soviet navy in defending
the homeland—at ever-increasing
distances from home waters. In doing so,
he also embraced and demonstrated the
power of warships as tools of statecraft.
Soviet port visits expanded to harbors
all over the globe, demonstrating
the USSR’s strategic reach, maritime
prowess, and suitability as a partner.
Admiral Gorshkov embraced technology, and there were areas in which
Soviet advances ran ahead of those of
the United States. These ranged from

fabricating the titanium hulls of Alphaclass submarines to putting gas turbine
engines into warships well before the
United States. He was able to acquire
massive amounts of matériel—steel
and electronics, among others—and
trained personnel to grow his fleet.
It can be easy to lose sight of all the
other challenges Gorshkov had to face
while he built his fleet. There were
political alliances to manage, political
enemies to avoid, and the couching of
every plan and decision in a manner
acceptable to party ideologues and
leaders. Polmar and company do fine
work in covering these aspects.
If there is a weakness in the work, the
authors identify and acknowledge it.
Although they make a valiant effort, it
is hard to reveal Sergey Gorshkov the
man. It is doubtful whether anyone
could have done a better job, but those
wanting to know about Gorshkov’s
personal life will have to wait.
An easy read and a compelling work,
Admiral Gorshkov is a welcome
addition to biographies of great
naval leaders, builders, and thinkers.
Gorshkov too often is neglected in
discussions of naval strategists; it is
high time for him to be included.
RICHARD NORTON
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